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A REQUIEM FOR THE RETAIL INVESTOR?
Alicia Davis Evans*
INTRODUCTION
TIHE American retail investor is dying. In 1950, retail investors
owned over 90% of the stock of U.S. corporations.1 Today, re-
tail investors own less than 30%2 and represent a very small per-
centage of U.S. trading volume. Data on the overall level of retail
trading in U.S. equity markets are not available. But recent New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") data reveal that trades by indi-
vidual investors represent, on average, less than 2% of NYSE trad-
ing volume for NYSE-listed firms. There is no question that U.S.
securities markets are now dominated by institutional investors.
In his article, "The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionali-
zation of the Securities Markets,"' Professor Donald Langevoort
offers a compelling, original account of the challenges facing the
Securities and Exchange Commission as it turns seventy-five years
old in the face of securities markets characterized by increasing in-
stitutionalization. Professor Langevoort's article offers several in-
teresting insights and serves as an important commentary on the
appropriate regulatory model for a marketplace strikingly different
from the one existing at the time of the SEC's founding. Despite
the enormous contribution of the work, however, I find some of
Professor Langevoort's assertions regarding the SEC's focus and
* Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. J.D., Yale Law School;
MBA, Harvard Business School. Thanks to Don Herzog, Adam Pritchard, and Mark
West for helpful comments.
'John C. Bogle, Editorial, Individual Stockholder, R.I.P., Wall St. J., Oct. 3, 2005, at
A16.
'Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of
the Securities Markets, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1025, 1026 n.4 (2009). As Professor Langevoort
notes, however, though retail investors' proportion of ownership has declined, the ab-
solute dollar amount of direct retail investment has increased over time. Id.
'Alicia Davis Evans, Do Individual Investors Affect Share Price Accuracy? Some
Preliminary Evidence, 38 (Univ. of Mich. L. Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law and
Econ., Working Paper No. 07-018, 2009), available at http://www.law.uich.edu/
centersandprograms/olin/abstracts/Pages/07-018.aspx.
' Langevoort, supra note 2.
1105
HeinOnline  -- 95 Va. L. Rev. 1105 2009
Virginia Law Review
capabilities, and his assumptions regarding the contours of an insti-
tutionalized marketplace, unconvincing. In this commentary, I ad-
dress three concerns. First, Professor Langevoort is skeptical that
the SEC, with a history of what he terms retail-driven regulation, is
equipped to regulate a highly institutionalized marketplace.5 I
question the claim that regulation of the markets for issuer securi-
ties is, in any meaningful sense, retail investor driven and argue
that there is no reason to think that the SEC is incapable of regu-
lating a marketplace with limited direct individual investor partici-
pation. Second, Professor Langevoort conducts a thought experi-
ment regarding the likely emergence of an institutions-only trading
market that could substitute for public capital markets and be
regulated as antifraud-only.6 He argues that this is unlikely to ever
occur in the current political climate, but nonetheless holds up such
a market as clearly preferable to the status quo.7 I agree that the
emergence of such a market is unlikely, but I am skeptical of his
idealized notion of an institutions-only marketplace. Finally, Pro-
fessor Langevoort, in addressing mutual recognition proposals,8 ar-
gues that foreign issuers seeking to sell securities in the United
States should be subject only to the laws of their home countries, as
long as those laws are "reasonably responsive to institutional inves-
tor interests."9 This would be in lieu of subjecting such issuers to
the purportedly retail-driven regulation that is the hallmark of U.S.
securities markets. I question exactly what it means for the laws in
a foreign issuer's home country to be "responsive to institutional
investor interests" and argue that this proposed standard for sub-
stantial comparability is insufficiently definite to guide policy deci-
sions in this area.10
Id. at 1026.
See id. at 1057; see also infra Part II for a discussion of the concept of an antifraud-
only regulatory stance.
7Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1066-68.
'See infra Part III for a discussion of mutual recognition.
' Langevoort, supra note 2 at 1079.
10 See Part III for a discussion of substantial comparability.
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I. Is U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION RETAIL INVESTOR DRIVEN? IF
So, DOES IT MAT[ER?
Professor Langevoort asserts that U.S. securities regulation is re-
tail investor driven because of the rhetorical stress on protecting
the interests of individual investors that often accompanies SEC
rulemaking and enforcement activity." And, given the SEC's his-
torical focus on retail investor needs, Professor Langevoort ques-
tions the agency's ability to oversee an institutionalized market-
place.'2 Yet, as an initial matter, it is far from clear that U.S.
securities regulation is driven by concern for the interests of retail
investors. Certainly, the SEC's mandate focuses its attention on re-
tail investor protection with respect to the regulation of securities
market professionals who interact directly with individual inves-
tors; securities regulation here serves an important function in lim-
iting abuse. Professor Langevoort contends, however, that even the
regulation of the markets for issuer securities is retail investor
driven." Though it is correct that many regulatory policies had, as a
goal, at least in part, the protection of individual investors, many
things drive agency activity, so it is difficult to know with any cer-
tainty precisely which considerations have played a predominant
role in shaping regulatory policy. Even if it is true that current pol-
icy has been shaped by concern for the needs of individual inves-
tors, it is unclear why the SEC's historical focus on retail investor
interests is particularly relevant to the question of the SEC's ability
to regulate today's institutionalized marketplace. Professor Lan-
gevoort suggests that many regulations in this area were designed
to protect individuals and thus are unnecessary in markets domi-
nated by institutional investors. He is, therefore, concerned about
the SEC's ability to adjust its regulatory stance. In my view, how-
ever, because sophisticated institutional investors generally benefit
from current regulatory policies as much as, if not more than, indi-
vidual investors, this concern seems misplaced. It is not at all clear
that a significant regulatory overhaul is in order simply because in-
stitutional investors now dominate securities markets.
"Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1025.
12 Id. at 1025-26.
" Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1026-27 & n.7.
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Consider first the case of federal securities law disclosure re-
quirements. Though Congress' initial intent in enacting the Securi-
ties Act of 19334 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,"5 which
established the mandatory disclosure framework, was to protect
investors, 6 who at that time were almost exclusively individuals, it
does not necessarily follow that current regulation in this area pri-
marily benefits retail investors. Indeed, the results of empirical
studies on the use of federally mandated disclosure suggest that
current mandates are not excessive and are as valuable to institu-
tional investors as they are to retail investors. The American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") convened focus
groups with professional investors/advisors-such as analysts, bro-
kers, and portfolio strategists who focus on fundamental invest-
ing-and investor trade groups to determine the efficacy of finan-
cial information reporting. 7 The AICPA study found that, in the
view of the investors who participated, the business reporting sys-
tem in the United States generally works well and provides users
with essential information that heavily influences their decisions. 8
Survey data are sometimes unreliable and one should approach the
results with caution. It should be noted, however, that these study
participants expressed no desire for wholesale changes to the cur-
rent reporting system and did not generally view mandated disclo-
sures as irrelevant.
In another study, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
("FASB") collected information on "voluntary disclosures."' 9 It
1415 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2006).
"15 U.S.C §§ 78a-78nn (2006).
"See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects In-
vestors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation,
http://sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) ("Congress-during
the peak year of the Depression-passed the Securities Act of 1933. This law, to-
gether with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which created the SEC, was de-
signed to restore investor confidence in our capital markets by providing investors
and the markets with more reliable information and clear rules of honest dealing.").
" The Special Comm. on Fin. Reporting, Am. Inst. Certified Pub. Acct.,
Improving Business Reporting-A Customer Focus: Meeting the Information Needs
of Investors and Creditors (1994), available at http://www.aicpa.org/
Professional+Resources/Accounting+and+Auditing/Accounting+Standards/ibr.
1" Id.
"Business Reporting Research Project, Fin. Acct. Standards Bd., Improving Busi-
ness Reporting: Insights into Enhancing Voluntary Disclosures 1 (2001), available at
http://www.fasb.org/brrp/BRRP2.PDF. The working group considered disclosures not
1108 [Vol. 95:1105
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found that a number of leading publicly-traded companies volun-
tarily provide investors with an extensive amount of information
that is not required under the securities laws. Companies provide
these additional disclosures because a failure to do so could put
them at a competitive disadvantage if others in their industries
provide similar information to investors. Indeed, FASB predicted
that voluntary disclosures would increase in the future because of
the fast-paced nature of change in the business community.'
Institutional investors that engage in fundamental analysis need
information to make informed investment decisions. Of course,
some current mandatory disclosure items may not assist institu-
tional investors in making effective investment decisions,2' which
would make it appropriate for the SEC to reevaluate elements of
the disclosure regime. I offer no opinion on that issue in this Arti-
cle. What is clear, however, is that the current disclosure regime,
broadly speaking, has been embraced by sophisticated market par-
ticipants. Thus, there is no reason to believe that what some per-
ceive to be excessive disclosure requirements are responsive only
to individual investor needs.
There are at least two settings in which to test the proposition
that the benefits from the current mandatory disclosure regime ac-
crue primarily to individual investors. The first is the Rule 144A
private placement market in the United States, which is open only
to large institutional investors. According to Professor Langevoort,
U.S. market regulation critics view the success of the 144A market
specifically required under GAAP or SEC rules as "voluntary," even though such dis-
closures could be made, for example, to give a more complete picture of a company's
business as required by SEC rules. Id. at v.
'0 Id. at v-vi.
21 Such things undoubtedly exist. Examples of potential areas for reform can be
found in the results from another study conducted by FASB in which it asked a small
group of study participants, which included accountants and securities industry pro-
fessionals, what required disclosures under Regulation S-K (which contains require-
ments for non-financial statement portions of SEC disclosure documents) they would
limit or eliminate. Business Reporting Research Project, Fin. Acct. Standards Bd.,
GAAP-SEC Disclosure Requirements (2001), available at http://www.fasb.org/
brrp/brrp3pl.pdf. Their suggested changes were modest and included things such as
eliminating disclosure of quarterly stock prices, since real-time stock price quotes are
easily accessible, and limiting disclosures on real property to specialized industries
such as oil and gas where information on properties is more relevant. Id. at 36-38.
2009] 1109
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as evidence of "regulatory inefficiency" in traditional markets.'
This view, however, is odd. A study by Howell Jackson and Eric
Pan, for example, reveals that institutional investors in Rule 144A
transactions request and receive disclosures similar to those avail-
able in registered offerings.' This suggests that, consistent with the
survey evidence described above, sophisticated investors find cur-
rent mandated disclosures useful.
The second setting for testing the benefits to institutional inves-
tors of detailed disclosure requirements is any heavily institutional-
ized foreign market, such as those that exist in Europe, without
what Professor Langevoort terms the U.S. market's legacy of retail
investor protection. Though Professor Langevoort holds Europe
out as a largely institutionalized marketplace with light touch regu-
lation," he acknowledges that the substantive requirements for is-
22 Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1060.
2 See Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International
Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe-Part II, 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 207, 255-57
(2008) ("Although European issuers escaped many of the disclosure obligations un-
der U.S. securities law through Rule 144A transactions, they continued to voluntarily
follow US-style disclosure practices, even to the point of paying for lawyers to pre-
pare due diligence letters. One conclusion that can be drawn from such evidence is
that many European issuers did not mind, or at least recognized the value of, prepar-
ing full and detailed disclosure documents and subjecting themselves to due diligence
review. Therefore the decision not to conduct a U.S. public offering had less to do
with the tough U.S. disclosure requirements, and more to do with non-legal concerns
such as timing, placement success and recognition by the U.S. investment commu-
nity."). Professor Langevoort points to this study and notes that institutional investors
in such deals demand extensive protections, including mandatory disclosures and
fraud-related representations. Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1065 n.113 (citing Howell
E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International Securities Mar-
kets: Evidence from Europe-Part II, 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 207, 251-54 (2008)).
2 It should be noted that, though European-and in particular U.K-regulation is
often referred to as "light touch," this is not universally agreed to be the case. Indeed,
Callum McCarthy, former chairman of the United Kingdom's Financial Services Au-
thority ("FSA") states the following:
[It is a] myth ... that the FSA is a "light touch" regulator, with the implica-
tion that the attractiveness of the UK's regulatory regime is that it permits prac-
tices prohibited elsewhere. In its most extreme form-or its mistranslated
form-"light touch" is transcribed into "soft touch".
But in very many respects, the FSA is not "light touch". In some important
areas of financial services, for example, we regulate activities which are unregu-
lated in most other countries: hedge fund managers, for example, are subject to
a regulatory regime in the UK which has no legal equivalent in the US .... In
other areas, we have deliberately chosen a level of regulation which is more
HeinOnline  -- 95 Va. L. Rev. 1110 2009
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suer regulation are similar to, and sometimes exceed, the require-
ments of those in the United States. 5 Therefore, it is not at all clear
that the presence of retail investors drives substantive market regu-
lation, despite rhetoric to that effect.
One can point to other examples of securities regulations outside
the disclosure context that ostensibly were implemented specifi-
cally with the interests of retail investors in mind. Regulation FD
(fair disclosure) ("Reg FD"),26 which prohibits selective disclosure
by issuers, is one such example. Though Reg FD was designed to
level the playing field for individual investors, the SEC, when in-
troducing the regulation, offered a rationale that demonstrates that
Reg FD can protect institutional investors as much as retail inves-
tors.27 Before Reg FD, many issuers were using information as a
commodity to be traded with the investment community, including
the research analysts issuing buy and sell recommendations on
stocks, to curry favor and ensure positive reports. Those institu-
tions that failed to cooperate could be frozen out of the stream of
selectively disclosed information. Reg FD has made it possible for
all institutions and individuals to have access to relevant invest-
ment information at the same time. This benefits not only retail in-
vestors, but also non-favored institutions.
demanding than that adopted in some other countries. Nor should the FSA's
enforcement practices be regarded as light, still less soft, touch....
... [W]e have the flexibility to sanction firms for breach of principles, even
when no specific rule may have been broken....
For all these reasons-scope of regulation, ability to impose substantial fines,
ability to take action against breach of principle, even when no specific rule has
been broken-I think it misleading to characterise the FSA as "light touch."
Callum McCarthy, Chairman, Fin. Servs. Auth., Financial Regulation: Myth and Re-
ality, Speech to British American Business London Insight Series and Financial Ser-
vices Forum (Feb. 13, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
paces/Library/Communication/Speeches/2007/0213-cm.shtml).
Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1074 ("On disclosure, Europe is reasonably thorough
in how it addresses ongoing issuer disclosure and the potential for market abuse. In
terms of formal regulatory demands, there are numerous ways in which its mandates
for issuers actually exceeds what we have in the United States." (footnote omitted)).
Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2008).
27 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release 7881, 65 Fed.
Reg. 51,716 (2000) reprinted in [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91
86,319, at 83,677-78 (Aug. 24, 2000).
2009] 1111
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Another common allegation is that the "Plain English" initia-
tiveu-which requires issuer disclosure documents to be written in
clear, simple language-is another costly initiative imposed on
companies primarily to protect unsophisticated investors. 2 To be
sure, the SEC had the "ordinary" investor in mind when putting
forth this initiative. There is at least anecdotal evidence, however,
that sophisticated investors also appreciate "Plain English." Inves-
tor Warren Buffett, a billionaire and one of the most sophisticated
investors in the world, has said, "For more than forty years, I've
studied the documents that public companies file. Too often, I've
been unable to decipher just what is being said. ,,30 Most inves-
tors, even sophisticated investors, are not lawyers. Putting disclo-
sures into easy-to-understand language can reduce transaction
costs and facilitate the dissemination of clear information into the
market.
In summary, one may quibble with the rules imposed under the
current securities laws, but there are sophisticated investors who
find many of these rules beneficial. Those who believe certain rules
should be changed may have valid arguments. It is not clear, how-
ever, that the level of retail investor participation in securities mar-
kets has much bearing on whether these regulatory policies make
sense.
Professor Langevoort also suggests that enforcement activity, in-
cluding most prominently ex post shareholder litigation for regula-
tory violations, is a way in which securities regulation is designed to
be responsive to retail investor needs. Indeed, Professor
Langevoort indicates that, though some European regulations are
more stringent than those in the United States, Europe is less en-
forcement-oriented.3t He then suggests that this is the case, at least
in part, because of less need for securities litigation in the Euro-
2 Presentation of Information in Prospectuses, 17 C.F.R. § 230.421 (2008).
29For background, see generally Kenneth B. Firtel, Note, Plain English: A Reap-
praisal of the Intended Audience of Disclosure Under the Securities Act of 1933, 72
S. Cal. L. Rev. 851 1999 (discussing estimated costs involved with the Plain English
initiative in its early years).
3°Warren E. Buffett, Preface to Off. Inv. Educ. & Assistance, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, A Plain English Handbook: How To Create Clear SEC Disclosure Docu-
ments at 1 (1998).
3, Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1074. But see McCarthy, supra note 24, for the view
that U.K. enforcement is not "light touch."
[Vol. 95:11051112
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pean marketplace because of the dominance of European institu-
tional investors that can put pressure on corporate management.
32
His argument, thus, seems to be that the U.S. focus on litigation
and ex post deterrence efforts is a product of our markets' retail
legacy. It is not at all clear, however, that low enforcement inten-
sity would (or should) ever exist in the United States, even with lit-
tle or no direct individual investor market participation, so it also
may be unfair to characterize enforcement as primarily benefiting
retail investors.
Professor Langevoort argues that institutional investors do not
need heavy SEC enforcement and securities litigation to vindicate
their interests or to deter fraud or other inappropriate behavior.
Instead, institutional investors can use their market power to per-
suade corporations to act appropriately. Retail investors lack this
power and therefore, Professor Langevoort implies, need access to
other deterrence mechanisms, including government enforcement
and private rights of action. This position, however, strikes me as
untenable. Though one can argue that a firm's stockholders can in-
fluence the likelihood of a firm engaging in fraud or other acts of
disloyalty, the critical question, in my view, is not the proportion of
retail investors versus institutional investors. The more important
question relates to how many "investors" a firm has (that is, those
who have a long-term view and the ability and willingness to chal-
lenge management) versus "traders" (that is, those who move in
and out of stocks quickly in hopes of making short-term profits).
33
Though retail investors are unlikely to be "investors" as I define it
here (chiefly because they generally lack the ability to challenge
corporate managers in a meaningful way), one should not take it as
a given that institutions are necessarily "investors" either. In fact,
many institutional investors have a short-term outlook and make
no more effort to affect managerial behavior than their less power-
ful retail investor counterparts. Of course, one could argue that if
institutional investors have the power to affect the incidence of
fraud, but fail to do so, that does not mean that it is appropriate
"' Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1074.
31 Carolyn Brancato and Michael Price stress that institutions are not a monolithic
group and should not be treated as one, and make a distinction between "investors"
and "traders." Carolyn Brancato et al., The Institutional Investor's Goals for Corpo-
rate Law In The Twenty-First Century, 25 Del. J. Corp. L. 35, 45-47 (2000).
2009] 1113
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for them to look to the SEC or the courts to step in and come to
their assistance if they suffer losses. I offer no opinion on that in
this Article. As a society, however, we have an interest in deterring
fraud and corporate misbehavior, wholly apart from concerns
about direct investor losses, because fraud harms market integrity,
undermines investor confidence, and affects the allocation of capi-
tal in society. Therefore, enforcement still has an important role to
play in the regulation of securities markets, and it is not clear that
that role varies with the level of direct retail participation in the
marketplace.
Admittedly, the need for a class action mechanism to vindicate
securities fraud claims sprang from an acknowledgement of the col-
lective action problem facing small, dispersed shareholders. It is
not clear, however, that the mechanism as currently operated bene-
fits primarily individual investors. Today, the U.S. marketplace is
largely institutional, yet we still observe-relative to other coun-
tries-a high incidence of litigation. One could partially attribute
this fact to the zealousness of plaintiffs' attorneys in this area. That
said, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA")4--
as a means of ensuring that litigation has at least some investor di-
rection-mandates the appointment of a lead plaintiff. The lead
plaintiff usually is an institutional investor because an institution is
likely to have the highest stake in the litigation. Moreover, some
institutions opt out of class actions and pursue individual actions
(admittedly at the behest of plaintiffs' attorneys) and these sepa-
rate opt-out suits increase the incidence of litigation even more.35
Thus, it is hard to say with any confidence that we would observe a
substantial reduction in the rate of U.S. securities litigation if there
were no participation by retail investors in securities markets.
Even if securities regulation, as currently implemented, were bi-
ased in favor of retail investor interests, it still is unclear why this
fact would lead one to be skeptical of the SEC's ability to adapt to
an increasingly institutional marketplace. The SEC is made up of
' Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
3 See Kevin M. LaCroix, Opt-Outs: A Worrisome Trend in Securities Class
Action Litigation, InSights (Oakbridge Ins. Servs., Bloomfield, Conn.),
Apr. 2007, at 4-5, available at http://www.oakbridgeins.com/newsletters/
AprilOpt-OutsAWorrisomeTrendinSecuritiesClassActionLitigation.pdf.
HeinOnline  -- 95 Va. L. Rev. 1114 2009
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skilled professionals who have been able to adapt to market condi-
tions over the years.36 There is no reason to think they could not re-
spond appropriately to this change. Moreover, Professor
Langevoort argues that diversified institutions require less protec-
tion than the average undiversified retail investor. If that is the
case, were Congress and the SEC to adopt a more hands-off ap-
proach to securities regulation in this context, the SEC's job would
be easier, not more difficult.
II.WOULD AN INSTITUTIONS-ONLY MARKET BE MORE EFFICIENT?
Professor Langevoort engages in a thought experiment in which
he imagines an institutions-only trading market that could rival
public capital markets.37 For firms trading on this market, there
would be no mandatory disclosure, no Sarbanes-Oxley-type feder-
ally instituted corporate governance requirements, and "low-
intensity SEC enforcement."' Professor Langevoort asserts that we
are not that far, either as a legal or economic matter, from his
imagined world of a trading market closed to retail investors. In es-
sence, this hypothetical world would be a version of the Rule 144A
market with more widespread corporate and stockholder participa-
tion.39
36 As of the time of this writing, the SEC is facing a number of challenges related to
questions about its role in the market failures that contributed to the economic crisis
in the United States. These questions, however, are not directly related to concerns
about the relative proportions of retail and institutional investors in the marketplace,
the subject of this article.
37Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1057-70.
38Id. at 1057. Though Professor Langevoort does not say so explicitly, I assume that
state corporate law remains in place, even in this hypothetical world.
39 Id. at 1060. Thus far, U.S. firm participation in the rule 144A market has been lim-
ited. The only U.S. firms that have used the 144A marketplace for substantial equity
issuances are a private equity firm and a hedge fund. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr.,
The Birth of Rule 144A Equity Offerings, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 409, 410-12 (2008) (de-
scribing the 2007 equity offerings of Oaktree Capital Management, LLC, a hedge
fund, and Apollo Global Management, LLC, a private equity firm). U.S. firm "eq-
uity" issuances in the Rule 144A market have increased in recent years, but the over-
whelming majority of the "equity" capital raised actually takes the form of debt con-
vertible into equity securities. See Steven M. Davidoff, Paradigm Shift: Federal
Securities Regulation in the New Millennium, 2 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 339,
343 (2008) (reporting that 87.4% (figure calculated by author) of "equity" issuances
by domestic firms in the Rule 144A market in 2007 actually took the form of con-
vertible debt).
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Professor Langevoort argues, and I agree, that it is politically in-
feasible, particularly in this current time of financial crisis, to either
deregulate public markets or allow a substitute private market with
limited regulation to flourish.' Before reaching this conclusion,
however, Professor Langevoort asserts that such a state of affairs
would be preferable to the status quo, since an institutions-only
market would be more efficient than one that includes retail inves-
tors and would lead to better corporate governance. He is essen-
tially arguing that this nirvana-like state of full institutionalization
and associated substantial deregulation could be our reality, if not
for unfortunate political realities. In my view, this sentiment,
shared by many, reflects an idealized notion of an institutions-only
market.
There is reason to believe that this idealization is unfounded.
First, there is evidence that the presence of retail investors en-
hances market efficiency. This suggests that eliminating the partici-
pation of individual investors could have far-reaching implications
for market functioning. Second, as discussed briefly above, though
institutional investors have the capacity to serve as effective corpo-
rate monitors, many fail to do so. Thus, one could argue that the
institutionalization of securities markets has done little, if anything,
to improve corporate governance in the United States.
A. Market Functioning
Public markets perform a vital economic role, since accurate
share prices lead to the efficient allocation of capital. Individuals
make a number of contributions to market functioning. First, li-
quidity, one element of a well-functioning market, is enhanced by
the presence of individual investors. Deep and continuous markets
are important so that investors can be assured of finding trading
partners when they have a desire to buy or sell a particular stock.
Therefore, sufficient liquidity is a necessary condition for market
efficiency. The presence of even modestly active traders such as in-
dividual investors enhances market functioning.1
, Id. at 1065-67. I also question whether such a market would be attractive to mar-
ket participants.
" Indeed, there is evidence that individual traders perform unique market functions.
See, e.g., Ron Kaniel et al., Individual Investor Trading and Stock Returns, 63 J. Fin.
1116 [Vol. 95:1105
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Second, retail investor market participation, though declining
relative to that of institutions, is growing on an absolute basis.
Thus, individuals represent an important source of capital for U.S.
corporations. In 2006, approximately $5.5 trillion of U.S. equity in-
vestment dollars came from individual investors, up from $616 bil-
lion in 1965.2 Individual investor participation is particularly im-
portant for small capitalization companies. Almost all large
institutional investors are confined to making investments in large
cap corporations. Either their own charters or government regula-
tions limit their ability to buy stock in small companies because of
minimum size and maximum ownership requirements. Moreover,
most small cap stocks have thin floats, so any attempt to buy a sig-
nificant number of shares in a small cap company could move the
price of that stock higher instantly, making such investment no
longer attractive. Because institutions own only a small percentage
of the stock of small cap corporations, retail investors are impor-
tant for the survival of many of these firms.43
Capital from retail investors also provides a stable ownership
base for public corporations, as evidence shows that most individ-
ual stockholders trade relatively infrequently. For example, accord-
ing to a study performed by the Investment Company Institute and
the Securities Industry Association, 60% of surveyed individual in-
vestors made no trades at all during 2004. ' Of the remaining 40%
that did trade, 57% made five or fewer trades during the year and
79% made twelve or fewer trades."5 These figures stand in sharp
contrast to the much higher trading rates of institutional investors,
with annual turnover rates approaching or exceeding 100%.' Many
273 (2008) (describing the means by which retail investors provide liquidity for insti-
tutional investors).2 Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1026 n.4.
41 Paul A. Gompers & Andrew Metrick, Institutional Investors and Equity Prices
17-18 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6723, 1998), available at
htlp://www.nber.org/papers/w6723.
Inv. Co. Inst. & Sec. Indus. Ass'n, Appendices: Additional Figures for
Equity Ownership in America, 2005, at 16 (2005), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/
rpt_05_equity owners-append.pdf. These figures overstate direct market retail trad-
ing activity because the study includes purchases and sales of shares in a mutual fund
in its definition of "trade." Id. at 15 n.3.
" Id. at 17.
'6 The average annual turnover rate for domestic equity mutual funds appearing in
the Morningstar mutual fund database as of July 19, 2007 is 81%. The most active
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corporations, therefore, actively seek retail investment. Issuers of-
ten invite investment banks affiliated with retail brokerage houses
into securities offerings to gain access to retail investors, and there
are conferences organized by investor relations professionals
aimed at helping companies retain their retail investor bases and
attract additional retail investors. The virtues of direct retail inves-
tor participation in the market are generally not lost on corporate
managers who value a stable and relatively loyal shareholder
base. 7
Notwithstanding the benefits of direct retail participation in eq-
uity markets I outline above, Professor Langevoort argues that
eliminating retail investors from securities markets would lead to
"efficiency conditions [that are] much better." 8 His assertion is
consistent with the somewhat common view that individual inves-
tors are "noise traders" 9 that distort share prices and harm market
functioning." Despite this negative view of retail investors, evi-
traders (as represented by the top decile) have an average turnover rate of 263%.
Alicia Davis Evans, Are Investors' Gains and Losses from Securities Fraud Equal
Over Time? Some Preliminary Evidence, 34 tbl. 1 (Univ. of Mich. L. Sch. John M.
Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 09-002, 2009) available at
http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/olin/abstracts/Pages/09-002.aspx. See
also Bogle, supra note 1 (reporting that the average annual turnover rate for mutual
funds during the 1990-2005 period was 91%).
41 Professor Langevoort suggests that corporate managers may like retail investors
because of "greater opportunity for entrenchment and manipulation of noise traders."
Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1066 n.114. Of course, corporations may seek these in-
vestors because they are more complacent, but their participation does produce bene-
fits, even if some managers, though certainly not all, might seek them out for exploita-
tion purposes.
4' Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1064.
" Noise traders are investors that do not trade on fundamental company informa-
tion, but rather on rumors, fads, and other types of information deemed to be unreli-
able.
'0 See, e.g., Alok Kumar & Charles M.C. Lee, Retail Investor Sentiment and Return
Comovements, 61 J. Fin. 2451, 2484-85 (2006) (finding the existence of concerted ac-
tion on the part of individual investors and that the resulting "retail sentiment" does
not appear to stem from a consideration of company fundamentals); Soeren
Hvidkjaer, Small Trades and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns 20 (Robert H. Smith
School Research Paper No. RHS 06-018, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=869983 (finding that there is a systematic component to retail trading and
that this trading can cause or protract periods of stock price under- or overvaluation);
Brad M. Barber, et al., Do Noise Traders Move Markets? 22-23 (Dec. 2005) (unpub-
lished manuscript, available at http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/finance/Noise.pdf) (find-
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dence from international markets suggests that retail investors may
not be noise traders. For example, one researcher found no evi-
dence that individual investors were the source of noise trader risk
on the Australian equity market.51 Another study involving the Ko-
rean Stock Exchange found that retail investors appear to have an
informational advantage over institutional investors and are better
able to predict corporate events." In prior work, I provide addi-
tional evidence that contributes to the debate on whether individ-
ual investors are, as a group, noise traders. 3 In that study, I found
that increased trading by individual investors on the New York
Stock Exchange is correlated with an increase in share price accu-
racy as measured by R2. Under one, albeit highly controversial, in-
terpretation of R2, lower R2s imply more accurate stock prices."
The results from this study provide evidence that: (i) as the propor-
tion of trading by individual investors increases, the R2 of firms de-
creases; and (ii) there likely is a causal relationship between retail
investor trading and R2. This, thus, serves as evidence that it is at
least possible that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, trading by
individual investors enhances market efficiency by bringing rele-
vant private information to the market that is valuable in helping
set market prices.5
Even if retail investors are noise traders, they still provide mar-
ket benefits, as they (i) contribute, as mentioned above, to market
liquidity, 6 and (ii) provide incentives"' for informed traders to trade
ing that retail trades are correlated and that these trades move prices away from fun-
damental values)."I Andrew Jackson, The Aggregate Behaviour of Individual Investors 24-25 (July
29, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=536942).
5 Hyuk Choe et al., Do Domestic Investors Have More Valuable Information
About Individual Stocks than Foreign Investors? 21-22 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 8073, 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w8073.
Davis Evans, supra note 3.
, See id. for further discussion of the R' controversy.
5 Id. at 14.
As Fischer Black notes, if all traders had access to, and acted on, the same funda-
mental information, other than for liquidity reasons, there would be no reason to
trade. Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. Fin. 529, 530-31 (1986). Thus, noise traders are par-
ticularly important for liquidity.
" Gregory La Blanc & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, In Praise of Investor Irrationality in
The Law and Economics of Irrational Behavior, 542, 544 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon
L. Smith eds., 2005). Unfortunately, for noise traders, they provide these incentives to
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and consequently bring prices in line with fundamental values."
Thus, it is far from clear that the absence of retail investors would
improve market efficiency.
Rather than idealizing institutionalization, scholars and regula-
tors instead should question its effect on market efficiency. Not
only is there evidence that retail investors improve market effi-
ciency, but there is also reason to believe that institutional trading
may harm it. Securities regulation seeks to set the rules of the game
to provide a mechanism for the provision of capital for private in-
novation and to assist allocative efficiency (that is, allocating capi-
tal to its highest and best uses). To achieve this goal, regulators
strive to increase investor confidence, reduce information asymme-
tries through mandatory disclosure regulations,59 and combat fraud
(through public and private enforcement means) to prevent the
misallocation of capital. Otherwise, we leave it largely to the mar-
ket to decide which corporations deserve capital. Traditionally, in-
vestors made money when the value of their investments went up
because of improved corporate performance or prospects. This, in
turn, generated investor confidence and also served our allocative
efficiency goals because the firms that were profitable and efficient
continued to have high stock prices and access to capital.
Today's institutionalized marketplace has changed this basic
model. For sure, there are long-term buy and hold institutional in-
vestors that focus on company fundamentals. However, the mar-
ketplace has a large number of investors that make money from
things that are only indirectly related to corporate performance.
For example, mutual funds earn fees just for holding assets.
Though the flow of funds is tied to investment returns (which
should be related to portfolio company performance), such a tie is
informed traders by suffering losses when trading against them. Id. at 566. I am not
suggesting that this is a fair result for noise traders or one to which regulators should
aspire.
8 Black, supra note 56, at 531-32. Conversely, informed traders may be less willing
to participate in markets with substantial noise trading, given the limits of arbitrage. J.
Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. Pol. Econ.
703, 703 (1990) ("The unpredictability of noise traders' beliefs creates a risk in the
price of the asset that deters rational arbitrageurs from aggressively betting against
them.").
'9 Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 620 (3d ed. Aspen Publishers
2003).
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not reliable. Marketing is important to mutual fund inflows, and
there is often no way for retail investors to tell the difference be-
tween skill and luck.' Moreover, many institutions, particularly
hedge funds, engage in derivative transactions where the financial
payoffs can be detached from fundamental corporate values. Fur-
thermore, liquidity-induced trades by institutional investors are in-
creasing in importance relative to trading driven by information,
and this has implications for allocative efficiency. Some of the ac-
tivities of institutions make markets more efficient, but others take
markets farther away from the efficiency ideal.
Richard Bookstaber, hedge fund manager and former risk man-
ager for Salomon Brothers and Morgan Stanley, argues that liquid-
ity, not information, is the primary driver of day-to-day market
price movements in equity and bond markets.6 Bookstaber pro-
vides examples of various types of trades that are not prompted by
fundamental information, but rather by the traders' need for li-
quidity.62 These trades affect market prices, even when the partici-
pants know they are not driven by any information related to fun-
damental value.63 If Bookstaber is correct, and liquidity-driven
trading is rivaling or even usurping information-based trading,'
then the institutionalization of markets can do more to hurt alloca-
tive efficiency than any perceived risk of noise trading by retail in-
vestors.
Professor Langevoort acknowledges that there may be what he
terms "suboptimal investment behavior," even in his imagined pri-
vate institutions-only marketplace.6" Yet he asserts that the "smart
money" can neutralize any harm from these traders through arbi-
trage.' There are, however, well-known limits on the ability of ar-
60 See generally Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1051.
61 Richard Bookstaber, A Demon of our Own Design: Markets, Hedge Funds, and
the Perils of Financial Innovation 182 (2007).62 Id. at 182-84.
63Id. at 183.
6 The idea of a market being primarily liquidity-driven is not implausible. For ex-
ample, researchers have found that the trading of Hong Kong-listed securities on the
London Stock Exchange is liquidity rather than information-driven. See Sumit Agar-
wal et al., Where Does Price Discovery Occur for Stocks Traded in Multiple Markets?
Evidence from Hong Kong and London, 26 J. Int'l Money & Fin. 46, 62 (2007).
65 Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1050.
Id at 1064.
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bitrageurs to bring prices back to fundamental values.67 Thus, it is
far from clear that an institutions-only market would be as efficient
as many envision.
B. Corporate Governance
Professor Langevoort also asserts that corporate governance
would be improved in an institution-only marketplace. He states,
"Assuming a reasonably efficient, institution-driven private mar-
ket, the likelihood that the market could price the chosen forms of
disclosure and governance reasonably well makes it likely that in-
vestors on average would be better off than under detailed manda-
tory rules where there is no means of escape."' His conclusion is
not free from doubt, however.
Under traditional finance theory, a firm's stock price should
equal the present value of expected future cash flows. In an effi-
cient market, stock prices will reflect fully all publicly available in-
formation relevant to a firm's expected future cash flows.' There-
fore, in an efficient market, if the market were supplied with
information on disclosure and governance practices, the stock price
would reflect the perceived benefits and risks to investors. How-
ever, for this to be the case, we must believe that markets are effi-
67 See Mark Mitchell et al., Limited Arbitrage in Equity Markets, 57 J. Fin. 551, 551-
52 (2002). Mitchell et al. describe the ways in which imperfect information and market
frictions can limit arbitrage. First, uncertainty about the magnitude of an apparent
mispricing and the somewhat high costs to gather more information to learn about it
may make would-be arbitrageurs hesitant to attempt to exploit the opportunity. Sec-
ond, specialized arbitrageurs with undiversified portfolios bear unsystematic risks for
which they demand compensation and are possibly less likely to invest in arbitrage
opportunities than a diversified arbitrageur might. Also, specialized arbitrageurs may
be unwilling to bear the risk of loss that accompanies the potentially long, winding
process to which prices eventually converge to fundamental values. If, prior to con-
vergence, prices diverge even farther from fundamental value, an arbitrageur who
lacks access to capital when this divergence occurs may have to unwind her position
prematurely and incur a loss. Id.
' Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1065. Note that Professor Langevoort appears to
have a more measured view on market efficiency elsewhere in the article. See id. at
1074-75 ("Market efficiency is not a persuasive enough argument to lead to the con-
clusion that a mixed institutional-retail marketplace will consistently govern price is-
suers' governance and disclosure well enough such that no further regulatory inter-
vention is warranted....").
See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empiri-
cal Work, 25 J. Fin. 383, 383 (1970).
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cient. Market efficiency is a highly contested area of finance, and
there is a great deal of evidence calling the central tenets of market
efficiency into question. I will not relay the evidence from the de-
bate here; others have done so at some length." What seems clear,
however, is that standardized corporate governance requirements,
which allow for comparisons across firms, rather than ad hoc indi-
vidually negotiated ones, would be far easier for the market to as-
sess and price. Thus, it is unclear that the market's supposed pric-
ing ability would provide sufficient incentive for issuers to adopt
optimal disclosure and governance practices and make investors
better off as a whole.
Professor Langevoort goes on to argue that "almost certainly,
corporate governance would be improved in an institution-only
market because of shareholders' greater practical ability to coordi-
nate to exercise their law-given powers.... 71 I am skeptical of this
claim. Institutions currently are a dominant force ostensibly well-
equipped to monitor the firms in which they invest, yet most have
failed to engage in this activity in a meaningful way. And in his
article Professor Langevoort gives no indication as to how the ab-
sence of retail investor market participation would provide incen-
tives for institutions to do that which they have failed to do for
decades.
Many commentators have raised questions about institutions'
ability to monitor corporations and whether incentives exist for
them to do so.72 For example, John Bogle, founder of the Vanguard
mutual and index fund group, believes that institutions have the
ability to monitor, but have a long history of passivity that makes
them partially responsible for some of the corporate governance
lapses in the recent past.73 He argues that though one might think a
small group of professional managers replacing a diffuse group of
' See e.g., Alicia Davis Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. Corp. L. 223,
271-72 (2007), for a brief description of questions surrounding market efficiency and
the ability of the market to price corporate governance variables.
7' Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1065.
' See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional
Investor Behavior under Limited Regulation, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1997, 2055-77 (1994)
(questioning the effectiveness of institutional corporate governance in the U.K.); Jill
E. Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, 55 Ohio St. L.J.
1009, 1011 (1994).
13 Bogle, supra note 1.
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millions of individuals would lead to the professional managers ag-
gressively asserting their rights and demanding better corporate
governance, that is not the case. What we observe instead, despite
a few notable exceptions (for example, TIAA-CREF, unions, se-
lected state and local pension funds), are institutions that have
failed to take an active role in corporate affairs. '
Bogle argues that the reason for this passivity is that there are
agency costs inherent in what he terms our "agency society."'75
There are too many masters to pay, Bogle asserts. 6 For example,
Bogle points out that mutual fund managers receive compensation
from separate corporations that seek to maximize their own return
on capital, which can be in conflict with the mutual fund's mandate
to maximize the fund's investment returns for the benefit of the
fund's individual shareholders. ' According to Bogle, advisory fees,
sales loads, and commissions paid to brokers on portfolio transac-
tions in return for their sales support consumed approximately
45% of the real returns earned on managed portfolios over the last
20 years. 8
Finally, Bogle points out that, unlike institutions in the 1950s
and 1960s, today's institutional investors engage in short-term
speculation rather than traditional long-term investing that de-
pends on intrinsic corporate values. 9 Bogle notes that from 1950-
1965, average annual turnover for equity mutual funds was 17%
per year.' That figure rose to 91% for the period from 1990-2005.'
Bogle argues that investors with long-term ownership could not af-
ford to take effective corporate governance for granted, but to-
day's institutions, with their short investment horizons, have little
reason to care.' Thus, it is not clear that an institutions-only mar-
ketplace would necessarily lead to better corporate governance.
Moreover, were there to be no federally mandated corporate
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straints on corporate behavior would come from negotiated deals
between investors and issuers. Professor Langevoort views this as a
strength of his imagined world because we would no longer have
"one-size-fits-all" disclosure and governance standards.' Customi-
zation of desired protections has an intuitive appeal, but, as com-
mentators in the mandatory disclosure debate have argued and as
Professor Langevoort notes, there are efficiency gains that accrue
from having a single standard setter and enforcer.' Thus, some pri-
vate entity tasked with providing uniformity and order likely would
step into the void. What is unclear is whether having a new private
body set standards would be more efficient than leaving the task to
the SEC, which has been doing this for seventy-five years.
C. The Overestimation of the Value of Diversification and the
Diversification Paradox
Professor Langevoort argues that an institutions-only market
can be less regulated because institutions do not need the protec-
tion of the securities laws as currently conceived. He argues that
institutions have the power to force managers to comply with their
corporate governance demands. He asserts, however, that even if
there is some slippage and investor losses ensue, institutions, as di-
versified investors, will not suffer substantial harm. Thus, diversi-
fied investors may be victimized by corporate issuers, but their
losses are "absorbed with less pain."'85
For decades, securities regulation scholars have held up diversi-
fication as the ultimate protection against corporate governance
failings. For example, a familiar assertion with respect to investor
losses from securities fraud is that, for any diversified investor that
is an active trader, fraud-related gains and losses' are equal over
the long term.' Therefore, compensating these investors for securi-
3 Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1075.
'4Id. at 1060.
Id. at 1064.
"A shareholder who buys stock with a price artificially inflated by fraud suffers a
loss, and a shareholder who sells stock at an artificially inflated price because of fraud
enjoys a gain.
7 See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Ac-
tions, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1487, 1502 (1996); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 611, 641 (1985); Donald C.
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ties fraud losses is inefficient. In prior work, I find that, though in-
vestors are break even from fraud on average, there is a great deal
of variance in outcomes.' Thus, a large number of investors of all
types, and not just a few outliers, suffer extreme net losses or enjoy
extreme net gains from fraud. And, indeed, contrary to the conven-
tional wisdom among securities regulation scholars but consistent
with probability theory, active traders, such as mutual funds, are
less likely to be break-even from fraud than investors that trade
less frequently.89 Thus, institutional investors cannot rely on diver-
sification or an active trading strategy to make them neutral with
respect to fraud-related gains and losses.
Of course, proper diversification can protect investors from
business risks generally, including securities fraud risk. The diversi-
fication of institutions is a double-edged sword in this context,
however, and Professor Langevoort's thought experiment reveals
the paradox. On the one hand, if institutions are fully diversified
such that losses do not matter, they have no incentive to engage in
any corporate governance monitoring of the type envisioned in this
idealized institutions-only marketplace. Moreover, fully diversified
investors also have no incentive to invest in private information to
aid overall allocative efficiency.' On the other hand, if institutions
are not diversified, while perhaps better in one sense for securities
markets as these investors have an incentive to engage in monitor-
ing and private information investment, these inadequately diversi-
fied institutions subject the individual investors, whose interests
they are supposed to serve, to greater harm. One cannot know the
optimal average level of institutional diversification in this context,
but it is, of course, somewhere between complete diversification
and no diversification. That line, however, is difficult to draw. De-
Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 Ariz. L. Rev.
639, 646 (1996).
' Davis Evans, supra note 46, at 28.
89 Id.
Along a similar vein, Black and Coffee discuss the possibility of fund managers
with relatively small stakes in firms becoming "indifferent to whether a portfolio
company does well." They state, however, that interviews with British investment
managers reveal that other factors, including fiduciary duties and cultural norms,
would serve as a check on this attitude-or at least its open expression. Black & Cof-
fee, supra note 72, at 2064. Nonetheless, direct economic incentives for monitoring
are virtually nonexistent in the case of full diversification.
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spite rhetoric to the contrary, we do not want all institutions to act
as if they are risk neutral. For a deregulated securities market of
the sort envisioned by Professor Langevoort to function properly,
investors must feel some "pain" when they suffer losses.
III. DEFINING "SUFFICIENTLY COMPARABLE" IN ISSUER MUTUAL
RECOGNITION
Finally, Professor Langevoort considers the contours of mutual
recognition as it extends to foreign issuers trading on U.S. securi-
ties markets. Under current law, if a non-U.S. corporation wants to
list its securities on a U.S. exchange and/or raise capital in a public
offering in the United States, subject to certain exceptions, it must
register with the SEC. Doing so subjects the foreign issuer to U.S.
regulatory requirements. Current evidence, Professor Langevoort
notes, suggests that foreign issuers are hesitant to register with the
SEC and subject itself to U.S. regulation, including in particular the
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which many consider to be
burdensome. Under a "mutual recognition" regime, certain foreign
issuers would be permitted to list their shares on U.S. exchanges
and sell shares to U.S. investors without being subject to the full
panoply of U.S. securities laws and regulations. These issuers
would be subject only to the laws of their home country. The ques-
tion with which Professor Langevoort wrestles in his article is
which foreign issuers should have this privilege. Some commenta-
tors argue that foreign issuers with home country securities laws
that are "sufficiently comparable" to U.S. securities law should be
afforded this privilege. Professor Langevoort agrees and argues
that "sufficiently comparable" should mean laws that are "rea-
sonably responsive to institutional investor interests."91 Professor
Langevoort asserts that the only relevant consideration with re-
spect to foreign issuer regulation is investor protection. Since the
United States has a largely institutionalized marketplace, he ar-
gues, as long as the laws of the issuer's home jurisdiction are de-
signed to address the interests of these institutions, the issuer
should be free of all U.S. regulation, save liability for actual fraud.
I am skeptical that such a standard would provide the clarity
regulators need when deciding whether to extend mutual recogni-
9' Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1079.
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tion to issuers from a particular country. What exactly does "rea-
sonably responsive to institutional investor interests" mean? Which
institutional investors matter? In the United States, the interests
and investment strategies of hedge funds are often quite different
from those of pension funds which are also different from those of
mutual funds or insurance companies. Institutional investors are
not a monolithic group. As mentioned above, some institutions are
in-and-out, short-term traders, while others take a more long-term
view toward investment. The type of disclosures these different in-
vestors want and the types of corporate governance processes that
would be relevant to these investors are different.
Even if all institutions were long-term, information traders, what
would make a particular country's disclosure or governance regime
"reasonably responsive to institutional investor interests"? These
kinds of investors are interested in primarily two things: (1) infor-
mation on the issuer's business operations in a form that will allow
them to make investment decisions and (2) comfort that the com-
pany's representations are trustworthy (that is, that the investor is
not likely to fall victim to fraud). As discussed previously in Part I,
institutions generally want the types of disclosures required under
U.S. law currently. Also, as discussed in Part II above, institutions,
as a group, have not been aggressive in pressuring management to
conform to best practices in corporate governance. Thus, there is
still a meaningful role for regulation to play in limiting the poten-
tial for abuse. So, given these factors, I would argue, any country
with securities regulations similar to what we have in the United
States would have laws that are "reasonably responsive to institu-
tional investor interests." But how would regulators determine
what, short of U.S.-style disclosure and governance requirements,
would be responsive to the interests of institutional investors? Line
drawing in this area would be difficult, particularly given that U.S.
regulators would have to consider not only the substantive regula-
tions in place, but also the general culture of compliance and inves-
tor/corporate relations in a variety of diverse countries when mak-
ing such determinations. Of course, if one believes that mandatory
disclosure and governance requirements are unnecessary in an in-
stitutionalized marketplace, then line drawing might be simple: any
country, including those with no legal mandates regarding disclo-
sure or corporate governance, would qualify for mutual recogni-
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tion. This position, however, is untenable. As I argue above, there
are reasons why legal mandates make sense, even in an institution-
alized environment. But perhaps even more important, it is hard
to imagine such a strong deregulatory policy achieving political
traction.
CONCLUSION
The direct influence of retail investors on securities markets, as
measured by proportionate stock ownership and trading, has de-
clined significantly since the SEC's founding, and in his insightful
article, Professor Langevoort discusses the institutionalization of
securities markets and the appropriate SEC response. I find Pro-
fessor Langevoort's analysis of institutionalization helpful, but I
disagree with his characterization of securities regulation as retail
investor driven to the extent that such characterization suggests
that current policies are appropriate only in a marketplace domi-
nated by retail interests, given the benefits from regulation that ac-
crue to large institutional investors. I also disagree with Professor
Langevoort's skepticism regarding the SEC's ability to adapt to a
"new" marketplace reality. In my view, the SEC is well-equipped
to handle an institutionalized marketplace because this market is
not actually "new." The SEC has provided oversight to the evolv-
ing marketplace for decades, and if the SEC were to adopt Profes-
sor Langevoort's views on the appropriateness of deregulating se-
curities markets, the SEC's task would be easier than it is now, not
more difficult. I also am skeptical of the idealized notion of an in-
stitutionalized market that Professor Langevoort advances in his
article. There is no reason to believe that a market without retail
investors would be better than the status quo, and, indeed, there is
reason to fear that such a market would be worse. Though I take
issue with some of Professor Langevoort's assumptions and find his
proposed standard for substantial comparability in the mutual rec-
ognition context too indefinite, there is no question that his article
poses several interesting questions and offers keen insights that
should serve as important guideposts for the SEC going forward.
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